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Abstract 
Recent literature on multinational firms has stressed the importance of low productivity as a 
barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to 
shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms 
facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their im-
pact on the FDI decision (the extensive margin) and foreign affiliate sales (the intensive mar-
gin). We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German multinationals 
which contains information on parent-level and affiliate-level financial constraints as well as 
on the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign 
investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by large firms. Financial constraints at the 
parent level matter for the extensive, but less so for the intensive margin. For the intensive 
margin, financial constraints at the affiliate level are relatively more important. 
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1 Motivation 
Multinational firms are larger than their domestic counterparts. For European firms, Mayer 
and Ottaviano et al. (2007) show that multinational firms are also more productive, generate 
higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker, and they employ a 
larger number of skilled workers. In the theoretical literature, the characteristic size patterns 
of multinational firms are explained mainly by differences in productivity. According to this 
explanation, observed internationalization patterns reflect real constraints since only the more 
productive firms can afford to shoulder the fixed costs of market entry. 
These stylized facts are confirmed by our data for German companies, where firms owning 
foreign affiliates are indeed substantially larger than purely domestic firms (Graph 1a). Yet, 
the two groups of firms also differ in a number of other respects. Multinational firms, for in-
stance, have lower debt ratios and higher cash flows. This suggests difficulties in obtaining 
external finance as an additional impediment to foreign expansions.1 However, most of the 
theoretical literature considers the impact of financial constraints to be of lesser importance, 
arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) and the associated financing decisions can 
largely be treated separately.2 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the (relative) importance of real and financial barriers 
for the cross-border expansion of firms. In doing so, we distinguish between the decision to 
enter a foreign market for the first time (the extensive margin) and the decision on the volume 
of foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We proceed in two steps.  
In a first step, we theoretically analyze how productivity and financial constraints affect a 
firm’s choice to become a multinational firm under conditions of limited internal funds and 
the need to obtain external debt finance. Our model features limited contract enforceability 
and liquidation costs as two sources of inefficiencies in financial contracting that are particu-
larly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of testable implications con-
cerning the impact of financial constraints, productivity, and host-country characteristics on 
firms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we predict that financial constraints are 
                                                 
1  In the crisis that started in 2007, for instance, an increasing number of German firms reports credit con-
straints as an impediment to expansion into foreign countries (DIHK 2009). 
2  See, for example, Markusen (2002). 
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more likely to affect the extensive than the intensive margin, unless financial constraints are 
severe. Furthermore, we predict that financial constraints are more strongly felt for large 
firms, as they are more likely to be interested in foreign expansion.  
In a second step, we provide empirical evidence using data for German firms. We obtain in-
formation on the foreign affiliates of German firms from a detailed firm-level database pro-
vided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Direct Investment Micro-Database (MiDi). Further-
more, we use data on the balance sheets of firms in Germany from both the Dafne database 
provided by Bureau van Dijk and the Hoppenstedt database. Our data are unique as they al-
low measuring financial constraints and productivities at the parent level for both domestic 
firms and for multinationals, as well as financial constraints at the affiliate level. This enables 
us to analyze the extensive and the intensive margins of FDI. Furthermore, we can evaluate 
the relative importance of financial constraints at both the parent and at the affiliate level, a 
question that has – to the best of our knowledge – not been addressed in the literature so far. 
In contrast to earlier work focusing on manufacturing firms, our sample also contains services 
firms. 
Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work stressing the importance of productivity 
for firms’ international expansions. Seminal papers focusing on firms’ export decisions are 
Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003). Helpman et al. (2004) extend the Melitz model to 
account for multinational firms. The key to these models is that, ex ante, firms do not know 
their productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productivity from a commonly known pro-
ductivity distribution, and the level of productivity becomes common knowledge as well. De-
pending on the level of productivity, firms exit the market, they produce only for the domes-
tic market, they become exporters, or they set up affiliates abroad.  
The implicit assumption of these models is that firms can finance foreign operations inter-
nally and/or without incurring an external finance premium. Recent papers introduce financial 
constraints into the Melitz model. The focus of these models is on firms’ decisions to export. 
Chaney (2005) predicts that financially constrained firms are less likely to be able to cover 
the fixed costs of exporting. Manova (2006) examines the interaction of productivity and 
credit constraints and their impact on the export decision as well as the volume of export.  
Recent empirical work shows that financial frictions indeed affect export behavior. Using 
panel data on bilateral exports at the country level, Manova (2006) finds that financially more 
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developed countries are more likely to export, and that the effect is more pronounced in fi-
nancially vulnerable sectors. Firm-level studies show that financial constraints matter more 
for the extensive margin than for the intensive margin of exports (Berman and Héricourt 
2008), that export starters enjoy better financial conditions (Bellone et al. 2008), and that fi-
nancially healthy firms are more likely to export (Greenaway et al. 2007).3 Stiebale (2008), in 
contrast, finds no effect of financial constraints on a firm’s export decision once observed and 
unobserved firm heterogeneity is accounted for.  
This paper provides complementary evidence on the role of financial frictions for FDI. As 
predicted by our model, we find that productivity and financial constraints have a significant 
impact on German firms’ internationalization decision. Economically, productivity and finan-
cial constraints are of similar importance, but financial constraints matter most to the subset 
of firms that consider investing abroad. Our model also suggests that the extensive margin is 
more likely to be affected than the intensive margin, unless financial constraints are severe. 
Our empirical analysis shows that parent financial constraints have indeed a negative impact 
on the extensive margin of FDI, but less so on the intensive margin, mirroring findings by 
Berman and Héricourt (2008) for exports. However, we also find that, in contrast to the par-
ent-level constraints, the affiliate’s financial constraints matter for the intensive margin. This 
observation points towards a hierarchy of financing the intensive margin, with affiliate fi-
nancing being preferred over parent financing. 
In the following section, we present our model of multinational firms. In section three, we 
describe our data and provide descriptive statistics. Section four provides empirical evidence, 
and section five concludes.  
2 Finance and the Margins of FDI: Theory 
In this section, we analyze a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm and the volume of 
sales of its foreign affiliates in the presence of financial constraints. Firms incur fixed costs of 
market entry as well as variable costs of production. They finance their foreign expansion us-
ing internally generated funds as well as an external bank credit, potentially secured by col-
                                                 
3  Evidence on the reverse causality from exporting to financial conditions is mixed (Bellone et al. 2008, 
Greenaway et al. 2007). 
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lateral. Financing decisions are made under uncertainty.  
Financial constraints are firm-specific; they do not merely reflect differences across firms 
with regard to productivity. We do not specify the sources of “financial heterogeneity” but 
there are several reasons why firms may have different financial constraints. Firms differ, for 
instance, with regard to their customer structure and, thus, the probability of being hit by an 
adverse demand shock. Firms also differ with regard to the quality of their management and, 
thus, the ability of outside lenders to extract information on the profitability of an investment 
project. 
Financial contracting in our model suffers from potential inefficiencies due to limited en-
forceability of financial contracts, a problem particularly relevant when investing in a foreign 
country. Enforceability differs across countries and may be linked to the development of the 
financial market as well as the presence of home country banks abroad. With limited contract 
enforcement, collateral may be required to obtain credit financing. However, collecting and 
liquidating collateral generates transaction costs, and the amount of collateral available may 
be limited. The need for costly and limited collateral confines the use of external finance and 
thus the foreign expansion of firms.  
To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a multinational firm that can 
invest abroad to serve the foreign market.4 The firm’s alternative investment option is nor-
malized to zero.5 To set up a foreign affiliate, the firm has to incur a fixed cost of market en-
try . Once the firm has decided to set up a foreign affiliate, it has to choose the level of 
sales. Thus, we capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of the firm’s foreign ex-
pansion strategy. To fix ideas, consider the following variable production cost func-
tion,
F
)1(2
)(
2
β+=
x
xk , where x denotes the quantity produced and sold by the foreign affiliate. 
The productivity of the parent firm, which also spills over onto the foreign affiliate, is cap-
tured by β . The larger the fixed cost of entry and the lower a firm’s productivity, the larger 
                                                 
4   We focus on horizontal FDI. The qualitative implications of our model with regard to the impact of financial 
constraints would also go through for vertical FDI. 
5  It is straightforward to extend our model and to include an outside option like exports that depends posi-
tively on the firm’s productivity. As we show in Buch et al. (2009), the firm’s productivity level matters 
relatively more for the investment opportunity abroad than for the outside option of exporting. The qualita-
tive results of our model are unchanged. 
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are the “real barriers” that a firm faces when entering foreign markets. 
The firm also faces a “financial barrier” in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint because 
set up and production costs have to be paid before production starts and before revenues are 
generated. Revenues that can be generated on the foreign market are uncertain. Serving the 
foreign market yields positive revenues with probability  and zero revenues with prob-
ability , where 
px q
( q−1 ) p is the foreign price level.6 
Benchmark case without liquidity constraints 
Before we describe the impact of financial constraints on investment decisions, consider as a 
benchmark the first-best situation where the firm is not liquidity constrained. The firm can 
finance both the fixed cost of entry and the variable cost of production from internal funds . 
Thus, it maximizes the following profit function: 
L
(1) F
x
qpxFxkqpx −+−=−−= )1(2)(
2
βπ  
Taking the first-order condition, solving for the optimal sales of the affiliate qpxFB )1( β+=  
and inserting it back into the profit function (1) yields the following profits under the first-
best solution (FB): 
(1’) FpqFB −+= )1(2
1 22 βπ  
Thus, if liquidity is not an issue, the investment takes place if and only if 0≥FBπ , i.e. if net 
profits of the investment are positive. Not surprisingly, profits depend positively on the firm’s 
productivity (β ), i.e. less productive firms are less likely to be able to cover the fixed cost of 
market entry.  
Foreign expansion with liquidity constraints 
Consider now the situation where the firm is liquidity constrained, which we define as a situa-
tion in which its liquid assets L are not sufficient to cover the costs associated with market 
                                                 
6  We abstract from exchange rate changes, i.e. revenues generated on the foreign market can be remitted 1:1 
into domestic currency. Russ (2007) has a model in which endogenous adjustment of exchange rates affects 
firms’ entry decisions.  
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entry and production. Thus, the firm needs external finance. We assume that external finance 
is raised in the form of debt finance and, specifically, credits from banks. Firms can obtain 
credits from domestic or foreign banks. We do not model this choice explicitly and hence do 
not impose restrictions with regard to the degree of integration of financial markets. How-
ever, domestic and foreign banks may differ with regard to their ability to enforce contracts. 
For instance, if domestic banks maintain affiliates in the foreign country, too, they are in a 
better position than banks operating abroad solely to monitor the affiliates and collect collat-
eral. This adds to the comparative advantage that they already have in terms of knowledge 
about the domestic parent. The focus on external debt finance assumption reflects the fact that 
external equity finance plays a limited role for German firms (Bayraktar et al. 2005). Also, 
theoretical considerations suggest a “pecking order” of external finance according to which 
external equity finance and portfolio capital are dominated by bank lending.  
Let D denote the credit necessary to finance the fixed and variable costs of entry for a produc-
tion level x , given the available liquid funds , i.e. L LFxkD −+= )( . Furthermore, let 
denote the repayment of principal plus interest payment that the firm is supposed to 
pay. Like Manova (2006) and others, we assume that credit repayment is possible only if the 
revenues from foreign sales are positive. In particular, we rule out the possibility that the par-
ent firm steps in and repays the affiliate’s credit if the affiliate is not able to do so. This im-
plies also that the credit repayment 
Dr)1( +
D1( r )+ cannot exceed the revenues px , i.e. 
. Banks are assumed to operate competitively and to determine the interest rate 
such as to just break even in expected terms.  
px≤Dr+ )1(
To capture enforcement problems in financial contracts, we assume that credit repayment 
cannot be enforced with certainty, even if revenues are positive, but only with probability μ , 
with 10 <≤ μ . The enforcement parameter μ  has two interpretations. On the one hand, it can 
reflect different institutional quality across countries. Legal systems may, for instance, differ 
with regard to the degree of creditor friendliness and the enforceability of contracts.7 On the 
other hand, it could reflect a greater presence of home-country multinational banks in the host 
country. These banks may be able to acquire useful information on the host-country environ-
                                                 
7  Harrison et al. (2004) report that financial development lowers financial constraints. 
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ment and be able to monitor firms more closely through their affiliates abroad. This reduces 
informational asymmetries and makes it more likely that credit enforcement is successful. 
The firm can collateralize (part) of its credit with assets from two potential sources. First, the 
firm can pledge its fixed cost investment in the foreign affiliate, F, as collateral. Second, the 
firm can use an exogenously given collateral, C , provided by the parent company, to secure 
the credit. Let FCC +≤  denote the collateral actually chosen to secure the credit, the exact 
value of which is determined endogenously below. If the credit is not repaid, the creditor can 
seize the collateral to cover her losses. However, she can realize only a fraction θ of the col-
lateral when liquidating it.8 Thus, liquidating the collateral involves a dead weight loss of 
C)1( θ− .  
There are two situations where liquidation of a collateral (potentially) becomes an issue. Sup-
pose the affiliate has positive revenues but the creditor fails to be able to enforce the repay-
ment. Then, the bank has the option to liquidate the collateral. However, it would be ineffi-
cient to do so, due to the dead weight loss of liquidation. In this case, we assume that efficient 
renegotiation will make the firm pay Cθ , i.e. the amount that the bank can realize from liqui-
dating the collateral, to avoid inefficient liquidation, and the bank will accept this offer.9 If 
revenues are not positive, however, liquidation of the collateral cannot be avoided.  
Now, consider the zero profit condition for banks which determines the interest rate for a 
given choice of C: 
(2) DCqDrq =−++ θμμ )1()1(  
Banks obtain the promised credit repayment Dr)1( +  only if credit repayment can be en-
forced. In all other cases, they obtain the liquidation value of the collateral, Cθ , either be-
cause this is what the firm pays voluntarily, after renegotiation, or this is what they receive 
from actually liquidating the collateral. Solving for (1+r)D, we find that banks charge a risk 
premium over and above the risk-free rate which is declining in the probability of success of 
                                                 
8  Without loss of generality, we assume that the efficiency loss is the same for both kinds of collateral goods. 
9  This assumes that the firm can hold the bank down to its outside option of liquidating the collateral. It would 
be straightforward to modify this assumption and let the two parties split the gains from not liquidating the 
collateral. However, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive banking market, the first assumption 
seems to be the most convincing one. 
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the project (q) and in the efficiency of the liquidation procedure, (θ ):  
(3) 
q
CqDDr μ
θμ )1()1( −−=+ . 
Recall from above that the maximum repayment cannot exceed revenues, requiring: 
(4) px
q
CqDDr ≤−−=+ μ
θμ )1()1( . 
Note that the smallerμ , the more important it is to pledge a collateral for this condition to be 
satisfied. However, due to the dead weight loss in case the collateral is actually liquidated, 
which happens with positive probability, the firm limits the collateral pledged to the mini-
mum required to obtain the desired credit. Inserting FxkD L−+= )(  and solving for C yields 
the minimum collateral needed to finance the fixed cost of market entry and a given level of 
affiliate sales x, taking into account that the collateral has to be non-negative: 
(5) [ ] ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−−+= θμ
μ
)1(
)(,0max)(*
q
qpxLFxkxC  
The larger the required credit, the larger is the minimum collateral needed. Note, however, 
that the collateral cannot exceed the upper bound specified above, FC + . We consider, in 
turn, the cases where this upper bound of collateral constrains the firm’s optimal sales choice 
and where it does not, starting with the case of a non-binding collateral constraint. 
2.1 Non-Binding Collateral Constraint 
Suppose for a moment that the collateral constraint is not binding. Then, for a given level of 
affiliate sales x and collateral C, the firm expects the following profits: 
(6)  DFxkCqCqDrqqpx ++−−−−−+−= ])([)1()1()1( θμμπ . 
The first term reflects the expected revenues, the second term the debt repayment that can be 
enforced with probability μ  if revenues are positive, which happens with probability q. If 
credit repayment cannot be enforced, the firm voluntarily pays what the bank would be able 
to collect in the event of liquidation, Cθ , to avoid costly liquidation, as discussed above. If 
revenues are not positive, however, the collateral will be liquidated, as captured by the fourth 
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term. The last terms capture the cost of market entry and production and the credit obtained 
by the firm to finance these costs, respectively. 
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal sales of the affiliate x, taking into ac-
count the collateral needed to finance market entry and production, : )(* xC
Using  and the equations (3) and (5) for (1 + r)D and , we obtain: LFxkD −+= )( )(* xC
(6’) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−−+−−−−−= θμ
μθπ
)1(
])([;0max)1)(1()(
q
qpxLFxkqFxkqpx   
Note that if , i.e. if no collateral is needed to secure the credit, financing costs do 
not bias the investment decision. If collateral is needed, however, expected profits are low-
ered by the expected liquidation cost, 
0)(* =xC
)(*)1)(1( xCq θ−− . 
The following proposition characterizes the solutions of the firm’s maximization problem. 
Proposition 1: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins  
The profit-maximizing sales level x* is characterized by the following solution: 
(7) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
==+
><++
+
=
0*)(*)1(
0*)(*)1(
1
1
*
xCforxqp
xCforxqp
z
z
x
FB
FB
β
βμ
   with θμ
θ
)1(
)1)(1(
q
qz −
−−=  
The maximum profit the firm can attain is given by  
(8) 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
==−+
>≤−−−++
+
=
0*)(*)1(
2
1
0*)(*for)()1(
2
1
)1(
)1(
*
22
22
2
xCforFpq
xCFLFzpq
z
z
FB
FB
πβ
πβμ
π      
provided that the maximum exogenous collateral is not binding, i.e.  
FxCC −≥ *)(*  
Proof: See Appendix 
Note that for 1=μ , the optimum level of sales is the same as the first-best level. Also, if 
1=θ , then , and again the optimum level of sales is the same as in the first-best case. 
Thus, the optimum level of sales differs from the first-best choice only if both 
0=z
1<μ  and 
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1<θ . The intuition for this is straightforward. Only if contract enforcement is less than per-
fect may a collateral be required to obtain a credit, and only if the use of a collateral is costly 
does it affect the marginal cost of financing the production. Thus, only if a costly collateral is 
required do profits fall short of first-best profits. 
Of course, the firm will engage in FDI only if the maximum profits from investment are non-
negative. The following proposition characterizes the comparative statics for the firm’s exten-
sive and intensive margins of investment. 
Proposition 2: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics 
Changes in the following parameters affect the probability of non-negative profits and thus 
the probability of engaging in FDI: 
0*,0*,0*,0*,0*,0*,0* =><>>>>
Cd
d
dL
d
dF
d
d
d
d
d
dp
d
d
d πππ
μ
π
θ
ππ
β
π  
Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative static results for 
the optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales: 
0***,0*,0*,0*,0* ===>>>>
Cd
dx
dL
dx
dF
dx
d
dx
d
dx
dp
dx
d
dx
μθβ  
Proof: See Appendix 
Both the optimal volume of sales and the firm’s profits increase in the firm’s productivity and 
in the lucrativeness of foreign markets. Furthermore, better contract enforcement in the host 
country has a positive effect on sales and profits because it lowers the requirement to use 
costly collateral, and improving the efficiency of liquidating collateral reduces costs. Higher 
fixed cost lower expected profits not only directly but also indirectly. The larger the fixed 
cost, the fewer liquid funds are left for financing the investment. Less liquid funds, in turn, 
mean greater need for using costly collateral. Hence, there is an indirect negative effect of 
fixed cost over and above the direct effect. However, fixed cost and internal funds do not af-
fect the optimal level of sales choice because the marginal cost of using collateral does not 
depend on how much collateral is actually needed. The maximum collateral, in turn, has no 
effect on profits and on the firm’s choice of sales as long as it does not impose a binding con-
straint.  
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This scenario describes the situation of a mildly financially constrained investor. The need for 
credit financing and the requirement of providing collateral increase the marginal cost of in-
vestment and hence limit the volume of sales and profits. However, as long as the collateral 
requirement does not impose a binding constraint, the constraints are not as severe, as fixed 
cost and internal funds affect the extensive margin only, not the intensive margin. 
2.2 Binding Collateral Constraint 
Consider now the case where the collateral constraint is binding for the optimal sales level 
determined above,  , i.e. *xx =
(9) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−−+≡<+ θμ
μ
)1(
*]*)([;0)*(*
q
qpxLFxkxCFC .   
In this case,  cannot be implemented because the credit constraint becomes binding. In-
stead, production settles at a smaller level 
*x
x  that is determined by the maximum available 
exogenous collateral: 
(10) θμ
μ
)1(
])([
q
xqpLFxkFC −
−−+=+ . 
Solving this equation for x  and inserting it into the firm’s profit function, yields the con-
strained optimal level of sales choices and profits as characterized by the following Proposi-
tion. 
 Proposition 3: Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins 
Suppose the maximum exogenous collateral imposes a binding constraint on the firm’s opti-
mal choice of the level of sales, i.e.  
(11) FxCC −< *)(*  
Then, the investor can attain a maximum profit of   
(12) *])[1)(1(])([ πθπ ≤+−−−+−= FCqFxkxqp  
Where the level of sales *xx <  is determined by equation (10) 
Proof: See Appendix 
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Not surprisingly, profits fall short of the second-best profits that can be attained if the collat-
eral constraint is non-binding. The following proposition characterizes the comparative static 
results for the extensive and intensive margins. 
Proposition 4: Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics 
The following comparative static results characterize the extensive margins of FDI, summa-
rizing which parameters are more or less likely to ensure non-negative profits: 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0 >><>>>>
Cd
d
dL
d
dF
d
d
d
d
d
dp
d
d
d πππ
μ
π
θ
ππ
β
π  
and 
0,0
22
>> β
π
β
π
dLd
d
dCd
d . 
Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative statics for the 
optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales: 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0 >><>>>>
Cd
xd
dL
xd
dF
xd
d
xd
d
xd
dp
xd
d
xd
μθβ  
and  
0,0
22
>> ββ dLd
xd
dCd
xd . 
Proof: See Appendix 
Like above, productivity, lucrativeness of foreign markets, contract enforcement, and the ef-
ficiency of collateral liquidation positively affect both the extensive and the intensive margin 
of foreign direct investment. Unlike before, however, fixed costs and internal funds now af-
fect the level of sales as well, because higher fixed cost (or fewer internal funds) leave fewer 
funds for the financing of production, which cannot be compensated by increasing credit fi-
nancing if the collateral constraint becomes binding. And of course both margins are posi-
tively affected if the collateral constraint becomes less binding.  
We also find that the financial status of the firm as captured by the liquid funds and the col-
lateral available plays a more important role for more productive firms, since they are the 
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ones more likely to invest. Thus, a high productivity is a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion for foreign expansion. 
This scenario captures the case of a more severely financially constrained firm that is not only 
exposed to higher marginal cost of credit financing, but that is also constrained in its access to 
collateral. The firm is constrained not only at the extensive, but also at the intensive margin of 
expansion. Of course, in reality, the two cases may be considered as representing the two lim-
its of a continuous distribution, with marginal cost of using a collateral increasing in the size 
of the collateral. It would be straightforward to generalize our set up and to allow for a more 
continuous distribution of financial constraints.  
2.3 Financial Constraints at the Affiliate Level 
So far, we have assumed the liquid funds (L) and the exogenous collateral (C ) to be provided 
by the parent firm. For the market entry decision, this is the natural assumption. Over time, 
however, the foreign affiliate may in turn accumulate earnings and collateral goods that may 
affect the financing constraints for the volume of sales.  A natural extension of the model 
would thus be to take into account liquid funds and collateral goods provided by the affiliate 
itself. It seems plausible to conjecture that funds provided by the affiliate incur lower oppor-
tunity cost and/or dead weight losses than funds provided by the parent firm.10 If this is the 
case, we would expect funds provided by the affiliate to be used first, and only if they are not 
sufficient would we expect them to be supplemented by funds provided by the parent. 
2.4 Summing Up 
The model has rich implications for the determinants of firms’ intensive and extensive mar-
gins of foreign activities. Higher productivity, more efficient liquidation of collateral, better 
contract enforcement, and more lucrative foreign markets always increase the volume of af-
filiate sales. Higher fixed costs decrease and higher internal funds increase activities. The im-
pact of these variables on the intensive margin depends on whether the collateral constraint is 
                                                 
10  This is a topic discussed extensively in the literature on internal capital markets. See for example Brusco 
and Panunzi (2005) or Inderst and Laux (2005). For a survey see Stein (2003). 
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binding. They have no effect on the intensive margin if the available collateral is sufficiently 
large. Likewise, the impact of the size of the collateral depends on the scenario considered. It 
should matter most when the collateral available is low. Finally, our model predicts that fi-
nancial constraints matter more for larger, more productive firms, since these firms are more 
likely to be interested in foreign expansions. Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the 
comparative static analyses.  
3 Data and Stylized Facts 
3.1 Data Sources11  
crodatabase Direct Investment), provided by the Deutsche 
tor of 10 or drop to 1/10 or less) in order to control for possible merger-
                                                
To investigate the importance of real and financial constraints for the foreign investment 
choices of firms, we use data from three sources. Dafne and Hoppenstedt are commercial da-
tabases providing financial information on a large panel of firms that are active in Germany.12 
We use these datasets to obtain information on parent-level financial constraints and produc-
tivity. Information on the number of German firms’ foreign affiliates, their sales, the host 
countries, and affiliate-level financial constraints are obtained from the firm-level database on 
multinational firms MiDi (Mi
Bundesbank (Lipponer 2008).  
To eliminate outliers, we start from the full Dafne dataset and drop firms with negative values 
for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on cash flow 
and sales, we eliminate observations for firms which do not report an income statement. We 
additionally truncate some of the data at the 1st and 99th percentile. Finally, we drop observa-
tions showing large changes in sales or in the number of employees from one year to another 
(increase by a fac
induced outliers. 
Table 4 compares the structure of the sample after the outlier correction (“corrected sample”) 
 
11  See Table 2 in the Appendix for details. 
12  Dafne is the German equivalent to the European firm-level database Amadeus. Bayraktar et al. (2005) also 
use the German data from Amadeus for an analysis of firm-level domestic investment behaviour. 
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and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“regression sample”). The two samples 
are fairly similar in terms of the percentage allocation of the number of firms across sectors. 
We have also compared the structure of our sample to the sectoral structure of the German 
economy as a whole, and the rank correlation in terms of sectoral structure of sales has 
proven to be quite high.  
3.2 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Extensive and Intensive Margin 
By merging the firm-level databases Dafne and Hoppenstedt with information on the foreign 
affiliates of German firms provided in MiDi, we obtain a dataset which includes two groups 
of firms. The first group contains purely domestic German firms, i.e. firms which do not hold 
affiliates abroad (‘Domestic Firms’) (94.5 % of the firm-year observations). The second 
group consists of German firms with foreign affiliates (‘German MNEs’) (5.5 %). From 
MiDi, we also obtain a count variable on the number of affiliates that a given parent operates 
abroad. This serves as an additional proxy for the extensive margin of foreign activities, 
which measures complex FDI strategies involving many affiliates. We also have information 
 a firm’s foreign affiliates’ sales as a measure of the intensive margin.  on the volume of
Productivity 
In line with the theoretical model, we use cost efficiency as a firm-level measure of produc-
tivity. Cost efficiency is given by parent sales over total costs, i.e. labor costs plus the costs of 
other inputs. A higher value reflects higher cost efficiency, hence we expect a positive sign. 
Higher sales relative to total costs might also reflect higher mark-ups. The expected sign of 
the coefficient would be the same. We include the size of the parent as a measure for its pro-
ductivity, and the expected sign is positive. 
Fixed costs 
The parent’s fixed costs of investment are proxied by the ratio of fixed over total assets. We 
use the ratio rather than the level of this variable as we additionally account for size effects in 
our regressions. We expect a negative impact of the fixed asset share on the extensive margin. 
The impact of this variable on the intensive margin could be insignificant, according to our 
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model, if the collateral available is sufficiently large.  
Internal funds 
In our model, we distinguish liquid funds from less liquid collateral as two determinants of 
financial constraints. Log cash flow of the parent is used to measure the internal funds avail-
able for financing a particular investment project. This variable should have a positive impact 
on the extensive margin of foreign activities. As in the case of fixed cost, its impact could be 
insignificant on the intensive margin if the collateral available is sufficiently large. In addi-
tion, we look at retained earnings of the affiliate as a measure for the liquid funds available to 
the affiliate to finance the intensive margin. Again, the expected sign is positive or insignifi-
cant.13 
Collateral 
The debt ratio measures leverage at the parent and at the affiliate levels ex ante. We can in-
terpret the debt ratio as a measure of the firms’ collateral – firms which are more highly lev-
eraged ex ante have, ceteris paribus, fewer assets available that can serve as collateral for 
new credits. Hence, the expected sign for the parent debt ratio is negative for both the exten-
sive and the intensive margins if the collateral constraint is binding. Similarly, the expected 
sign for the affiliate debt ratio is negative for the intensive margin. Firms may also report a 
high leverage ratio precisely because they have taken out a credit in order to finance FDI. If 
interpretation, we should expect a positive sign of the coefficient. this were the correct 
Foreign market size 
In our theoretical model, we have described the attractiveness of the foreign market in terms 
of the price that firms can fetch abroad for their product. In our empirical model, we distin-
guish two aspects of foreign market size. The first is the size of the market measured through 
its GDP. The second is the state of development of a foreign market measured through GDP 
 positive sign for both variables.  
                                                
per capita. We expect a
 
13  Following Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) criticism, there has been a lively debate on the usefulness of in-
vestment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure for financial constraints. The focus of the discussion have 
been endogeneity issues as well as issues of adequately taking into account access to external finance. See 
also Brown et al (2009) for an overview of this discussion. We use lagged variables to address the simulta-
neity of firm-level variables issue. We also include the debt ratio, as discussed below.  
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Contract enforcement 
The probability of contract enforcement depends on two parameters – an index measuring the 
difficulty of contract enforcement as well as the presence of affiliates of German banks 
abroad. The variable (weak) contract enforcement gives the number of procedures required to 
enforce contracts, and the expected impact is negative. This variable can be expected to influ-
ence both, the entry decision as well as the volume of activities, and we include it for both 
margins. Affiliates of German banks should be at an advantage over other lenders with regard 
to monitoring foreign affiliates and enforcing contracts. We use MiDi to obtain information 
on the volume of FDI of German banks by country, and we expect a positive impact on the 
intensive margin. 
en the two types of firms in terms of cost efficiency are small 
 international orientation of firms could be driven 
y financial factors just as by real factors. 
 
3.3 Stylized Facts  
In Graphs 1a-1e, we visualize the differences between German MNEs and Domestic Firms by 
plotting the Kernel densities of size (Graph 1a), cost efficiency (Graph 1b), cash flow (Graph 
1c), the debt ratio (Graph 1d), and the share of fixed assets (Graph 1e).  
Graph 1a confirms stylized facts reported in earlier papers using firm-level data (e.g. Mayer 
and Ottaviano et al. 2008): MNEs are larger than purely domestic firms. Unreported one-
sided t-tests on the equality of the means between the two sub-samples show that this differ-
ence is statistically significant. Measuring size through the volume of sales gives a very simi-
lar result. MNEs also exhibit a somewhat lower share of fixed assets (Graph 1e). Graph 1b 
shows that differences betwe
and, in fact, not significant.  
Hence, while the dividing line between multinationals and non-multinationals is not as clear-
cut as might have been expected on the basis of the cost efficiency of these firms, the dividing 
line is clear for measures of financial status. Multinationals have significantly higher cash 
flow (Graph 1c) and lower debt ratios (Graph 1d). Prima facie, these graphs suggest that het-
erogeneity with regard to the openness and
b
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4 Productivity versus Financial Constraints: Regression Results 
Our main empirical model relates financial constraints and productivity to the pattern of in-
ternationalization at the firm level. We are interested in two main questions. First, do finan-
cial constraints and productivity affect the probability of investing abroad? Second, do these 
factors affect the volume of foreign affiliates’ sales? We answer these questions in two steps. 
In a first step, we analyze the determinants of the firms’ extensive margin of FDI using the 
probability of investing abroad and the number of affiliates as dependent variable. In a second 
step, we analyze the sales of affiliates across countries, i.e. the intensive margin. We also es-
sive margins jointly using a Heckman selection model. 
Our baseline regression for the extensive margin – the decision to enter a foreign market – is 
given by the following probit model: 
(12) 
timate the extensive and inten
4.1 Extensive Margin 
(Pr ) titktitki TSIFDI ,543,21,10,, εαααααα ++++++= − ZZ  
( ) tki 1, −ti
( tk ,Z ) are vectors of firm-level (country-level) control variables.
where  indicates whether a firm i has invested abroad in year t in country k. 
riable turns out to be positive 
and significant on the extensive margin regarding the number of affiliates abroad but insig-
sample. In columns (2)-(7), we split the sample by size, by sector (manufacturing versus ser-
                                                
FDI ,,Pr Z  
14 We include the ratio of 
sales over total costs as a measure of cost efficiency. Our main proxies for financial barriers 
are cash flow and the debt ratio. The country-level control variables are GDP, GDP per cap-
ita, and the severity of contract enforcement. We additionally include firm size, and a full set 
of industry (I), German states (S), and time (T) dummies. These dummies capture systematic 
differences across industries and states as well as common macroeconomic effects. We also 
include an exporter dummy to account for the fact that exporting is typically a stepping stone 
into international markets (see Helpman et al. 2004). This va
nificant regarding the probability of owning foreign affiliates. 
Table 5 shows the results. Column (1) has the baseline specification for the full regression 
 
14  Firm-level regressors are lagged by one period to account for the simultaneity of the explanatory variables. 
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vices), and by legal status (listed versus unlisted). While the sub-sample of listed firms is 
small (6,165 versus 51,922 firm-country-year observations), it nevertheless serves as a useful 
test of the impact of financial frictions. A priori, we expect financial frictions to be less im-
sector firms and suggests that size is a better proxy for productivity than cost effi-
nt impact, con-
st effi-
                                                
portant for the listed firms with access to a larger range of financial sources. 
Larger and more efficient firms are more likely to be multinationals. Size has a positive and 
significant impact on the probability of being a multinational, and this effect is robust across 
specifications. Contrary to expectations, cost efficiency is negative and significant in some 
specifications. This effect is driven by certain sub-samples such as the large firms and the 
services 
ciency. 
Our measure for fixed cost of market entry, the fixed asset share, has a strong and signifi-
cantly negative impact on the probability of investing abroad for all specifications, as ex-
pected.15 Berman and Héricourt (2008) as well as Manova (2006) interpret the fixed asset 
share as capturing the tangibility of assets, and hence as a measure of easier access to external 
finance secured by collateral. Following their interpretation, the expected effect is positive. 
The negative coefficient we find suggests that, for FDI, our interpretation is the more appro-
priate one. Financial constraints have a significant and robust impact on the extensive margin. 
Cash flow is mostly positive and significant. The debt ratio has an insignifica
sistent with the prediction of the model for non-binding collateral constraints. 
The marginal effects reported in Table 5 show a similar importance of productivity and finan-
cial frictions. Generally, however, fixed costs of entry (the fixed asset share) and the country-
level variables are more important than variables such as size or the debt ratio. Mean elastic-
ities also shows the strongest response to changes in log GDP (elasticity of +0.66), co
ciency (-0.45), firm size (+0.30), the fixed asset share (+0.23), and cash flow (+0.16). 
To study the interaction of productivity and financial constraints, we split the sample. We 
take firm size as an indicator for firm productivity. One of the financial variables – the debt 
ratio – is insignificant for both groups. The other – cash flow – matters for large firms, but not 
 
15  An alternative interpretation of this finding is that firms with a large share of intangibles and thus firm-
specific know-how are more likely to venture abroad. These firms would also have a lower fixed asset 
share. 
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for small firms. The latter finding may look counterintuitive at first sight, as one would ex-
pect smaller firms to be more opaque and hence more likely to be affected by financial con-
straints. Our finding is, however, consistent with the prediction of our model that financial 
constraints should matter the more, the more productive the firm and hence the more inter-
ested it is in expanding abroad.16 Financial constraints, in other words, do not impede the for-
eign expansion of small firms because these firms are not productive enough to invest abroad 
in the first place. It is also consistent with the finding of Berman and Hericourt (2008) who 
observe that productivity has no effect on a firm’s export decision if the firm faces financial 
act enforcement lower the probability that a given 
 capturing 
contract enforcement and market size play an important role for the entry decision. 
4.2 Extensive Margin: Number of Affiliates 
These models, therefore, allow controlling for the large share of zeros in our data to a differ-
                                                
constraints.  
The country-level variables are significant and have the expected sign. GDP is positive and 
significant, and GDP per capita is positive and significant for the full sample and for most of 
the sample splits, thus confirming the expectation that market size matters. Consistent with 
our model, greater difficulties with contr
German firm enters a particular country. 
In sum, our results show that parent-level financial constraints and productivity affect the ex-
tensive margin of foreign entry: larger, more efficient, and firms with a lower share of fixed 
assets are more likely to become multinationals. In addition, country-level variables
An alternative way of looking at the extensive margin of firms’ foreign activities is to count 
the number of foreign affiliates that a given parent holds. Adding an affiliate implies new set-
up costs, hence the count data models presented in Table 6 provide information on the deter-
minants of complex FDI strategies. The count data models differ in their assumptions regard-
ing the moments of the distribution and the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
 
16  Chaney (2005) distinguishes three classes of firms, with low, intermediate and high productivity. He pre-
dicts that firms with low productivity are not affected by financial constraints, since investing abroad is not 
a viable option for them, even without financial constraints. More productive firms, instead, are hampered 
by financial constraints in their foreign expansion strategy. In his model, very productive firms are by con-
struction not liquidity constrained and hence not affected by financial constraints. 
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ing degree.17 The basic count data model is the Poisson model which is quite restrictive in 
assuming that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. 
The Negative Binomial model allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity and for 
overdispersion. It is the preferable model, as the equidispersion assumption is strongly re-
jected for our data. Finally, zero-inflated models assign an even higher weight to the probabil-
ity of observing a zero in the dependent variable. 
Results from count data models support our finding that larger, less indebted parents, firms 
with a lower share of fixed assets, and firms with higher cash flow are more active interna-
tionally. Cost efficiency is negative or insignificant. The debt ratio has a negative impact on 
the extensive margin when using the number of foreign affiliates. This is consistent with the 
interpretation of high debt ratios as indicators of low collateral at the parent level which is 
available to back up new lending.18  
4.3 Intensive Margin: Sales of Affiliates 
We now focus on the sales of the foreign affiliate, while taking the decision to become a mul-
tinational as well as its location as given. The dependent variable ( ) tijkSales ,log
tk ,Z
 are the sales 
of affiliate j of parent i in country k, and the regression equation includes control variables at 
the parent level ( ), at the affiliate level ( ), and at the country level ( ): ti,Z tj,Z
(13) ( ) 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 5,log i t j t k t ijk tijk tSales S T ,α α α α α α ε= + + + + + +Z Z Z    
We estimate this equation as a parent-level fixed effects model; results are given in Table 7. 
In contrast to the results for the extensive margin, all our parent-level measures for real and 
financial constraints are insignificant for the intensive margin. Given that most parent charac-
teristics are already absorbed by the fixed effects, variables that capture parents’ real and fi-
nancial constraints do not have an additional impact on the sales of their affiliates. The re-
tained earnings of the affiliate enter with a positive and significant sign in all specifications. 
Hence, the availability of liquid funds which also reflects the profitability of the affiliate mat-
                                                 
17 For a detailed description of count data models, see, for example, Jones et al. (2007). 
18  Naturally, we omit the country-level variables from these regressions. 
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ters for the volume of activities.  
Our host-country regressors again yield the expected signs. German firms have larger foreign 
affiliates in larger countries and in countries hosting many German banks. While the impact 
of market size per se is not surprising and would, in fact, be borne out by many theoretical 
models, the positive impact of bank FDI is in support of our theoretical model. A greater 
presence of home country banks and thus familiarity of domestic lenders with the foreign 
market should improve the collection of information on the foreign affiliate. This increases 
the probability that collateral can be collected abroad, thus lowering the costs of financing 
and increasing the volume of lending.  
In columns (2)-(5), we perform similar sample splits by size and sector. The overall findings 
are very similar with two exceptions. Size (negative) and cash flow (positive) are weakly sig-
nificant (at the 10%-level) for the large firms. The positive sign on cash flow is consistent 
with the previous finding that financial constraints matter most for firms with larger foreign 
activities. Also, within the group of already large firms, the relatively small ones have higher 
foreign affiliate sales. 
Whereas parent-level frictions do not matter for the volume of activities, financial frictions at 
the affiliate level have an impact on affiliate sales. This is a novel finding since, to the best of 
our knowledge, the joined impact of parent- and affiliate-level financial frictions has not been 
analyzed before. These results suggest a hierarchy of financing foreign expansion, where 
preference is given to local funds and only if they are not sufficient, parent funds are used, 
albeit at potentially higher opportunity cost.  
4.4 Heckman Selection Model 
So far, we have treated the decision whether to enter a foreign country and the decision how 
much to produce and sell separately. To check whether this assumption is justified, we esti-
mate a Heckman selection model, which explicitly accounts for the selection into the FDI 
mode (Table 8). We use state dummies as exclusion restrictions, thus accounting for the fact 
that – historically – different regions in Germany have different degrees of international 
openness. Variables measured at the affiliate level and German bank FDI abroad are included 
in the outcome but not in the selection equation. The Mills ratio in the outcome equation – 
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affiliate sales – is insignificant, which justifies our earlier assumption to model the extensive 
and the intensive margin separately.  
Qualitative results by and large confirm earlier findings. It is interesting to see that some vari-
ables affect the probability of setting up an affiliate, but not the volume of its sales. Higher 
cash flow has a positive impact on the selection into foreign status but not on the volume of 
sales. This effect is, consistent with the findings reported above, driven by the large firms. 
Country-level variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have a strong positive impact on the 
extensive margin, but none on the intensive margin.  
Some parent-level variables such as cost efficiency (negative), size (positive) and fixed asset 
share (negative) have a consistent impact on both margins.19 Affiliate’s retained earnings 
have a strong and significant positive impact on the intensive margin, thus confirming the 
previous finding that distinguishing parent- and affiliate level frictions is important. (Weak) 
contract enforcement also influences both margins negatively, as expected. Bank FDI has the 
expected positive impact on the intensive margin. 
Finally, splitting the sample into small and large firms confirms that selection into foreign 
status is affected by financial constraints for the large firms. Market size has a positive and 
significant impact on the volume of foreign sales of large firms and a negative impact on 
sales of small firms. This reflects scale economies and the sorting of smaller firms into 
smaller markets.  
4.5 Summing Up 
Comparing our empirical results to the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1, we find 
that they are more consistent with the scenario of non-binding than with the scenario of bind-
ing collateral constraints. Our measure for the parent’s internal funds, cash flow, is consis-
tently significant for the extensive margin, but not for the intensive margin. Our measure for 
the parent’s collateral, the debt ratio, is mostly insignificant at both the extensive and inten-
sive margin, the only exception being the Heckman selection equation for large firms and the 
count model of affiliates where the coefficient of the parent’s debt ratio is significantly nega-
                                                 
19  Note that results in Table 8 are not fully comparable to those in Table 7 since we do not include parent fixed 
effects in Table 8 but state, sector, and year fixed effects. 
 23
tive. The fixed asset share as our measure for fixed cost is significantly negative at the exten-
sive and insignificant at the intensive margin, with the exception of the Heckman outcome 
equation.  Size is always significantly positive for the extensive margin, and, in the Heckman 
outcome equation, also for the intensive margin. Inconsistent with the model, our alternative 
measure of productivity (cost efficiency) is frequently insignificant or exhibits the wrong 
sign. A similar observation has been made by Greenaway et al (2007) who find insignificant 
coefficients for their measure of productivity (TFP) on firm’s export choice, but significantly 
positive coefficients for size. 
5 Conclusions 
Multinationals are large. Earlier literature focuses on differences in productivity across firms 
as an explanation for this stylized fact. More productive firms find it easier to shoulder the 
fixed costs of foreign entry, thus being more likely to enter new markets. This paper analyzes 
the importance of financial constraints as an additional barrier to entry into foreign markets.  
We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence using data on firms’ extensive margin 
of foreign activities (the probability to be a multinational firm) as well as their intensive mar-
gin (the volume of affiliate sales across countries). Considering real barriers to entry as cap-
tured by size/productivity and entry cost, we find that larger firms and firms with a smaller 
share of fixed assets are consistently more likely to become multinationals, and these firms 
also have larger foreign activities. Cost efficiency, in contrast, does not have the expected 
positive impact.  
Considering financial constraints, our empirical results confirm that these constraints matter 
for foreign expansions. Parents with larger cash flow are more likely to become multination-
als and have more affiliates. For the intensive margin, we find a weaker impact of parent-
level financial constraints, but a strong positive impact of affiliate’s retained earnings. This 
suggests a financing hierarchy for the intensive margin, with affiliate financing to be the first 
and parent financing to be the second choice. Furthermore, considering the interaction of real 
and financial barriers, financial constraints matter more for large firms because these firms 
are most likely to expand abroad. 
The findings of our paper have a number of implications for different literatures. To the lit-
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erature of multinational firms, we add a mechanism through which productivity and financial 
constraints interact. Models ignoring financial constraints would predict that enhancement of 
firm productivity could improve firms’ access to foreign markets. Our results suggest that 
high productivity may be a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition for foreign expansion. 
Lowering financial constraints might be just as important, as even large and productive firms 
are hampered in their internationalization strategy by financial constraints. 
To the banking literature, we add a mechanism explaining why banks and non-financial firms 
typically expand into foreign markets in tandem. One reason for the “follow their customer” 
patterns in the data could be that home-country banks that are active abroad could have com-
parative advantages over local banks in enforcing credit repayment and in assessing the cred-
itworthiness of FDI projects. This does not ultimately resolve the “follow their customer” 
question, but the specific interaction between financial and real barriers to entry that we stress 
may provide the possibility of testing this link more structurally.  
Finally, our findings can have implications for the international macroeconomic literature. 
Essentially, the financial constraints imbedded in our model are similar to financial accelera-
tor mechanisms used to model the interaction between the financial sector and business cy-
cles. In this sense, extensions of our model might provide useful insights into credit channel 
mechanisms in open economies and the persistence of shocks triggering entry into foreign 
markets.   
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7 Mathematical Appendix  
Proof of  Proposition 1 
We obtain  by taking the first-order condition from (6) or (6’) respectively, setting it equal 
to zero and solving for the optimal . To see that 
*x
*x FBxx ≤* , note that 11
1 <+
+
z
zμ  if 1<μ  , 
which is required for a positive collateral to be needed. FBππ ≤*
*
 follows directly from 
 and can be shown analytically by checking that FBxx ≤* ππ >FB  whenever .  0>C
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Consider first . It is straightforward to see that: *x
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Consider next the comparative statics for *π .  
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π  are straightforward to see. To see 
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that 0* >θ
π
d
d  and 0* >μ
π
d
d  , note that 0* >θd
dx and 0* >μd
dx . Using a revealed preference 
argument, it follows that the profit has to be increasing in these parameters as well. 
Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 3 
We find the constrained optimal choice of x by solving the collateral constraint: 
θμ
μ
)1(
])([
q
xqpLFxkFC −
−−+=+  
for x . This gives us a quadratic function of  x  which has the following solutions: 
[ ])()1()1(2)1()1( 22222/1 FCqLFpqqpx +−−−+−+±+= θμβμβμβ  
Since we are looking at constrained levels of sales that fall short of the second-best level of 
sales , the solution for the investor is to choose the larger of the two levels of sales. *x
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Consider first x . It is straightforward to see that: 
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Finally, note that 0>μd
xd , because increasing μ relaxes the collateral constraint. To see this, 
note that the right-hand side of:  
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μ
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decreases in μ , for a given x . To see this, note that:   
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To see the comparative statics for π  note that they have the same signs as the comparative 
statics for x because they follow from relaxing (or tightening) the constraints on the con-
strained choice of x .          Q.E.D. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Model and Empirical Measurement 
This Table summarizes the comparative static results of the model presented in Section 2. See Table 2 for the 
definitions of the empirical variables. 
Parameter Measurement 
Proposition II: 
Non-binding collateral con-
straint 
Proposition IV: 
Binding collateral constraint 
  Extensive margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Productivity (β ) Cost efficiency Sales / Total as-
sets 
+ + + + 
Foreign prices (p) 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
+ + + + 
Liquidation value (θ )  + + + + 
Probability of contract 
enforcement (μ ) Bank FDI  + + + + 
Probability of no con-
tract enforcement 
( μ−1 ) 
(Weak) contract 
enforcement 
– – – – 
Fixed costs (F) Fixed / Total as-sets – 0 – – 
Internal funds (L) 
Cash flow of the 
parent 
Retained earnings 
of the affiliate 
+ 0 + + 
Collateral (C) Debt ratio of the parent 0 0 + + 
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Table 2: Data 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, parent-level information comes from Dafne (Bureau van Dijk) and Hoppenstedt, 
affiliate level information comes from MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment, Deutsche Bundesbank). Coun-
try-level information comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. All values in €1,000 (unless 
otherwise indicated). Cash flow and cost efficiency are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at the 1st and 
99th percentile. Fixed asset share, the debt ratio, and sales are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at the 
99th percentile 
 
Variable Definition 
Parent-level data  
Cash flow Cash flow from operations  
Cost efficiency Sales / total cost (cost of materials + labor cost) 
Debt ratio Total debt / total assets 
Firms with foreign 
affiliate 
0/1 dummy for firms with foreign affiliates from Dafne-MiDi-merge 
Fixed asset share Fixed assets / total assets 
Number of foreign 
affiliates 
Count of total number of affiliates worldwide obtained from MiDi 
Sector definitions We use two definition of sectors: (i) A broad definition of 28 sectoral groups is used for 
sample splits (see also Table 5), (ii) a narrow definition of about 64 sectors at the 2-digit-
level, used to generate sector-level dummy variables 
Sales Turnover  
Affiliate-level data  
Debt ratio Total debt / total assets  
Sales Aggregate turnover of parent i in country j in year t, i.e. data are aggregated across all af-
filiates in a given country for a given parent and weighted by the parent’s ownership share 
Retained earnings 
/ total assets 
Revenue reserves / total assets  
Country-level data 
Bank FDI Aggregate volume of FDI of German banks in country j in year t, calculated from MiDi in 
€1,000 
(Weak) contract 
enforcement 
From the World Bank’s “Doing business” database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/), we 
use the variable “Enforcing contracts / Procedures (number)”  
GDP Host country GDP per capita in constant USD, converted into €bn, World Bank (2008) 
GDP per capita Host country GDP per capita per capita in constant USD, converted into €1,000, World 
Bank (2008) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
This Table provides summary statistics for the regressions reported below. GDP per capita is in €1,000. Nega-
tive values in ln(GDP per capita) hence come from countries with a GDP per capita of less than €1,000. Mini-
mum and maximum values for affiliate-level variables are not reported due to confidentiality reasons. 
a) Extensive margin 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cash flow (log) 176,034 5.347 2.245 0.000 10.653 
Cost efficiency 136,093 1.344 0.444 0.383 4.750 
Debt ratio 203,325 0.561 0.291 0.000 0.999 
Exporter dummy  211,205 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 
FDI dummy 211,205 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000 
Fixed / total assets 184,882 0.267 0.269 0.000 0.970 
Size (log) 211,143 7.825 2.404 0.000 18.922 
b) Intensive margin 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Affiliate-level      
Debt ratio 17,475 0.516 0.269 … … 
Retained earnings / total assets 17,475 0.059 0.132 … … 
Sales (log) 16,582 10.095 1.286 … … 
Parent-level      
Cash flow (log) 3,980 11.171 4.207 0.000 19.441 
Cost efficiency 3,682 1.307 0.330 0.393 4.690 
Debt ratio 5,269 0.433 0.229 0.000 0.999 
Fixed assets / total assets 4,924 0.246 0.219 0.000 0.963 
Number of foreign affiliates 4,222 4.429 9.878 1.000 … 
Size (log) 5,129 13.919 3.726 3.296 21.484 
Country-level       
Bank FDI (log) 296 11.601 2.282 4.754 16.812 
(Weak) contract enforcement  
(number of procedures) 243 36.078 6.373 21.000 51.000 
GDP (log) 438 4.541 1.873 -0.664 9.762 
GDP per capita (log) 434 1.707 1.386 -1.853 4.001 
Table 4: Corrected Versus Regression Sample 
This table compares the sample corrected for outliers (“corrected sample”) and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“Regression sample”). The two 
samples differ because of missing observations for the explanatory variables.  
 Regression sample Corrected sample 
 Number % Sales  (million €) % Number % 
Sales  
(million €) % 
Agriculture & Fishing 1,172 1.63 5,242 0.14 2,435 1.49 12,744 0.16
Chemicals 1,219 1.70 158,715 4.23 1,908 1.17 251,227 3.17
Construction 8,166 11.36 136,271 3.63 17,220 10.56 184,209 2.32
Education 273 0.38 3,293 0.09 798 0.49 17,049 0.21
Energy 2,308 3.21 183,807 4.90 4,271 2.62 598,190 7.54
Financial services 323 0.45 25,840 0.69 1,906 1.17 109,836 1.38
Food & Tobacco 1,568 2.18 169,024 4.50 2,865 1.76 387,082 4.88
Furniture 1,043 1.45 54,521 1.45 1,804 1.11 49,107 0.62
Glass 902 1.25 66,058 1.76 1,515 0.93 52,436 0.66
Health 2,302 3.20 75,202 2.00 4,596 2.82 158,890 2.00
Hotels & Restaurants 600 0.83 7,202 0.19 1,549 0.95 17,713 0.22
Coking 84 0.12 82,420 2.20 163 0.10 64,276 0.81
Leather 62 0.09 3,122 0.08 99 0.06 3,052 0.04
Machinery 3,502 4.87 262,599 7.00 5,934 3.64 317,839 4.01
Metals 4,063 5.65 138,351 3.69 7,619 4.67 283,242 3.57
Mining 279 0.39 13,555 0.36 572 0.35 128,760 1.62
Office equipment 2,695 3.75 235,198 6.27 4,718 2.89 253,050 3.19
Other services 2,382 3.31 72,376 1.93 6,482 3.97 213,489 2.69
Paper 1,566 2.18 62,047 1.65 3,052 1.87 138,107 1.74
Real estate & Business services 13,854 19.27 595,754 15.87 44,063 27.02 1,536,041 19.37
Rubber & Plastics 1,248 1.74 82,808 2.21 2,152 1.32 88,540 1.12
Textiles 736 1.02 22,114 0.59 1,335 0.82 55,160 0.70
Trade & repair 16,706 23.23 1,041,823 27.76 34,642 21.24 2,047,607 25.82
Transport & Communication 3,460 4.81 158,111 4.21 8,341 5.11 631,385 7.96
Vehicles 786 1.09 82,430 2.20 1,436 0.88 297,970 3.76
Wood 435 0.60 11,598 0.31 920 0.56 20,855 0.26
n.e.c 177 0.25 4,149 0.11 684 0.42 13,808 0.17
Total 71,911 100.00 3,753,631 100.00 163,079 100.00 7,931,660 100.00
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Table 5: Probability of Owning Affiliates Abroad 
This table reports results of probit regressions using a 0/1 dummy variable of owning foreign affiliates as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are at 
the parent level (P). Sample splits are at the sample median. Sector, state, and year fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are 
reported. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 Full sample Large Small Manufacturing Services Listed Unlisted 
Log size t-1 (P) 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P) -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.008 -0.010*** -0.006 -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P) -0.005 -0.016 0.004 -0.011 0.004 0.030 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.005) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P) 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.004** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P) -0.037*** -0.051*** -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.097*** -0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.032) (0.007) 
Log GDP 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
(Weak) contract en-
forcement 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Exporter (0/1) 0.000 0.003 -0.003** -0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) 
Observations 58,087 29,493 28,594 32,537 22,681 6165 51,922 
Pseudo R² 0.134 0.138 0.108 0.153 0.124 0.235 0.121 
log likelihood -9,500 -5,899 -3,532 -5,446 -3,553 -1,222 -8,197 
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Table 6: Determinants of the Number of Affiliates 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the Poisson (Negative Binomial, Zero-Inflated Poisson ZIP) 
regression using the total number of affiliates of each German firm as the dependent variable. Year fixed 
effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Poisson NegBin ZIP 
Log size t-1 (P) 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P) -0.006*** -0.001 -0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P) -0.016*** -0.001 -0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P) 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P) -0.048*** -0.019*** -0.065*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) 
Exporter (0/1) 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 71,911 71,911 71,911 
Pseudo R² 0.677 0.321 0.322 
log likelihood -27,438 -18,295 -20,976 
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Table 7: Determinants of the Volume of Affiliate Sales 
This table reports results of parent fixed effects panel regressions using the log sales of affiliates of domes-
tic multinational i in host country j as the dependent variable. (P) = parent-level variables, (A) = affiliate-
level variables. In Panel (b), sample splits are at the sample median. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, 
**, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 
Full sam-
ple Large Small 
Manufac-
turing Services 
Log size t-1 (P) -0.029 -0.128* 0.055 -0.014 -0.078 
 (0.048) (0.076) (0.061) (0.060) (0.093) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P) -0.112 -0.014 -0.118 -0.479 -0.059 
 (0.142) (0.332) (0.150) (0.322) (0.184) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P) -0.165 -0.072 -0.285 -0.065 -0.100 
 (0.277) (0.404) (0.404) (0.375) (0.483) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P) 0.033 0.125* -0.039 0.033 0.088 
 (0.045) (0.073) (0.056) (0.057) (0.088) 
Fixed asset share  t-1 (P) 0.009 0.021 0.049 -0.250 -0.212 
 (0.217) (0.262) (0.434) (0.322) (0.424) 
Retained earnings / total assets t-1(A) 0.585*** 0.447** 0.868*** 0.535*** 0.777** 
 (0.137) (0.176) (0.220) (0.155) (0.305) 
Debt ratio t-1 (A) -0.086 -0.017 -0.175 -0.092 0.001 
 (0.077) (0.103) (0.116) (0.089) (0.169) 
Log GDP 0.139*** 0.175*** 0.088*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.038) 
Log GDP per capita 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.056 0.084*** 0.094* 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.053) 
Log bank FDI 0.066*** 0.043*** 0.097*** 0.061*** 0.100*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025) 
(Weak) contract enforcement -0.012*** -0.009* -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.017** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant 8.531*** 8.769*** 8.319*** 8.827*** 8.155*** 
 (0.337) (0.627) (0.441) (0.542) (0.619) 
Observations 3,507 1,796 1,711 2,363 1,052 
R² 0.134 0.142 0.140 0.138 0.157 
Cross-sections 864 283 581 537 341 
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Table 8: Heckman Selection Model 
This table reports results of a Heckman selection model using the log sales of affiliates of domestic multi-
national i in host country j as the dependent variable. (P) = parent- level variables, (A) = affiliate-level vari-
ables. State, sector and year fixed effects included. Sector fixed effects included in the selection equation. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 Full sample Large Small 
 Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome  Selection 
Log size t-1 (P) 0.316*** 0.144*** 0.360*** 0.126*** 0.006 0.140*** 
 (0.047) (0.014) (0.055) (0.024) (0.147) (0.032) 
Cost efficiency t-1 (P) -0.540*** -0.179*** -0.450*** -0.214*** -0.525*** -0.050 
 (0.094) (0.041) (0.128) (0.057) (0.166) (0.066) 
Debt ratio t-1 (P) 0.047 -0.073 -0.152 -0.200** 0.240 0.071 
 (0.113) (0.056) (0.168) (0.083) (0.225) (0.084) 
Log cash flow t-1 (P) 0.005 0.064*** -0.007 0.096*** 0.014 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.040) (0.018) (0.052) (0.020) 
Fixed asset share t-1 (P) -0.688*** -0.517*** -0.903*** -0.479*** 0.283 -0.448***
 (0.220) (0.091) (0.276) (0.134) (0.506) (0.135) 
Log GDP 0.090 0.291*** 0.210*** 0.299*** -0.594** 0.288*** 
 (0.081) (0.009) (0.077) (0.013) (0.260) (0.014) 
Log GDP per capita -0.017 0.037*** -0.047 0.045** 0.068 0.028 
 (0.038) (0.014) (0.048) (0.019) (0.073) (0.022) 
(Weak) contract enforcement -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.016*** 0.014 -0.017***
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) 
Retained earnings /  0.326**  0.471**  -0.062  
total assets t-1 (A) (0.155)  (0.220)  (0.215)  
Debt ratio t-1 (A) -0.044  -0.189*  0.070  
 (0.083)  (0.114)  (0.122)  
Log bank FDI 0.090***  0.088***  0.091***  
 (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.022)  
Constant 5.903*** -5.045*** 4.183** -5.461*** 16.814*** -4.832***
 (1.704) (0.572) (1.960) (0.518) (5.285) (0.664) 
Observations 57,672 57,672 24,196 24,196 33,476 33,476 
Censored observations 55,373 55,373 22,804 22,804 32,569 32,569 
Mill’s ratio 0.166 0.166 0.337 0.337 -2.083 -2.083 
Standard error 0.322 0.322 0.297 0.297 1.042 1.042 
ρ 0.183 0.183 0.345 0.345 -1.000 -1.000 
Graph 1: Firm Characteristics by Multinational Status 
(a) Firm size 
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